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We model consumer switching in retail electricity markets in New Zealand to identify 
important determinants of switching and estimate willingness to pay (WTP) for six non-price 
attributes of electricity services, namely, call waiting time, length of fixed rate contract, 
renewable energy, loyalty rewards, supplier ownership, and supplier type. The results provide 
important insights into residential consumer switching, which inform policy and enable 
suppliers to differentiate their products. The analysis is based on 2,688 choice responses 
generated using an online choice experiment administered to a sample of 224 residential bill-
payers. A latent class model is used to distinguish important determinants of switching and 
preference heterogeneity. We find that non-price attributes of electricity services are significant 
determinants of consumer switching. Three latent classes with distinct preferences for the 
attributes are identified. The first class (40%) is mainly concerned about power bills and would 
switch supplier to save at least NZ$125 per year in power bills, ceteris paribus. This value 
mainly captures the status quo effect or preference for incumbent traditional suppliers. The 
second class (46%) exhibits no status quo preference, values all attributes, and particularly 
dislikes entrants from other sectors. These suppliers must charge NZ$135 per year less than 
traditional suppliers for a 50% chance of attracting customers. The third class (14%) consists 
of captive and loyal customers who are unlikely to switch supplier for any realistic power bill 
savings.  
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HIGHLIGHTS 
• Determinants of consumer switching in retail electricity markets are analysed. 
• Non-price attributes of electricity services influence consumer switching. 
• Three groups with clearly distinct preferences for the attributes are identified. 
• Status quo effect and dislike for non-traditional suppliers affect consumer switching. 




New Zealand, USA, UK, Norway, Sweden, and Australia have all implemented electricity 
market reforms since the 1980s. These reforms aimed at replacing monopolies with an efficient 
and competitive electricity sector but had limited success, particularly in the retail electricity 
sector, where most consumers seem reluctant to switch suppliers (see, Brennan, 2007; Daglish, 
2016; Defeuilley, 2009; Deller et al., 2014; Electricity Authority, 2011, 2012a, 2013a, 2015; 
Giulietti et al., 2014; Hortaçsu et al., 2017; Joskow, 2003). The willingness of consumers to 
switch suppliers is an important factor in determining the extent to which deregulated retail 
electricity markets become competitive (Electricity Authority, 2010), so consumers’ reluctance 
to switch suppliers creates a dilemma for policy makers. A better understanding of the factors 
that influence consumer switching can improve the design, implementation and effectiveness 
of policies aimed at promoting switching and ultimately achieve a more competitive electricity 
market. This paper identifies the determinants of consumer switching in New Zealand retail 
electricity markets.    
The model of competition underpinning the deregulation of retail electricity markets is 
premised on the idea that more competition will attract innovative and efficient entrants. These 
entrants will compete with incumbents, leading to lower prices and improved product quality 
(Defeuilley, 2009). At the same time, consumers will learn to find and compare offers and 
switch to the better supplier1. The implicit assumption of this model is that consumers are 
sensitive to price and other service attributes, and that they will switch to a supplier offering a 
better package of price and service attributes. However, the influence of service attributes on 
switching has generally been ignored in previous promotions of consumer switching. For 
example, switching promotions have mainly focused on the creation of switching websites, 
which act as one-stop-shops by offering price comparisons and allowing consumers to switch 
to the cheapest available supplier. Rarely, has any emphasis been placed on the level of 
provision of non-price attributes.  
Promoting switching on the basis of price differences alone appears to be based on the belief 
that: (1) consumers are price-sensitive, and small changes in price will induce switching, given 
the homogeneous nature of the product (Cai et al., 1998; Price, 2004); (2) brand value and 
service factors are likely to be very small for electricity retailing (Electricity Authority, 2010; 
                                                          
1 Supplier and retailer will be used interchangeably throughout this paper. 
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Wilson & Price, 2010); and (3) consumers are more likely to view suppliers to be the same 
except for the price (Gärling et al., 2008). Goett et al. (2000, p. 1) assert that “[t]he power of 
competitive pressures to lower prices depends on the degree to which customers are willing to 
switch suppliers in response to offers of lower prices.” This suggests that “price is all that 
matters”.  
Evidence from previous studies (e.g., Brennan, 2007; Defeuilley, 2009; Deller et al., 2014; 
Electricity Authority, 2011, 2013a, 2015; Giulietti et al., 2014; Hortaçsu et al., 2017) suggests 
that the creation of switching websites and their extensive publicity has proved ineffective at 
increasing switching rates in most jurisdictions, even during periods of rapidly increasing retail 
prices when substantial potential savings were available. So the level of retail competition in 
deregulated markets has failed to meet expectations. The relatively low switching rates have 
placed insufficient discipline on incumbent retailer behaviour leading to higher prices 
(Electricity Authority, 2010; Gamble et al., 2009; Gärling et al., 2008). For example, residential 
consumers in New Zealand faced rapidly increasing prices during the period 1985–2010, yet 
most consumers did not switch despite large price differences and entry of new suppliers into 
the retail markets. This suggests that switching behaviour may be influenced by other factors 
worth investigating further.  
Indeed, previous stated preference literature on consumer switching in retail electricity markets 
has shown that non-price attributes of electricity services are important determinants of 
supplier choice. However, this body of literature is relatively limited and has, for some time, 
been dominated by a few, somewhat dated, American and British studies conducted around the 
late 1990s and 2000 (e.g., Cai et al., 1998; Goett, 1998; Goett et al., 2000; Revelt & Train, 
2000). 
The growing interest in understanding consumer switching has seen a slight increase in analysis 
of consumer preferences for the attributes of electricity services (e.g., Abdullah & Mariel, 
2010; Amador et al., 2013; Hensher, Shore, & Train, 2014; Kaenzig et al., 2013; Yang, 2014). 
The focus of these studies differs depending on the main objective. While some studies identify 
important determinants of supplier choice or switching by valuing the attributes of electricity 
suppliers (Amador et al., 2013; Cai et al., 1998; Goett et al., 2000; Hensher et al., 2014; Kaenzig 
et al., 2013; Revelt & Train, 2000), others focus on: (1) attitudes that motivate or prevent 
consumers from switching (e.g., Gamble et al., 2009); (2) barriers to switching (Electricity 
Authority, 2010, 2012a, 2016; Gamble et al., 2007; Gärling et al., 2008; Giulietti et al., 2014; 
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Ministry of Economic Development, 2005a); and (3) determinants of WTP for the attributes 
(Abdullah & Mariel, 2010; Amador et al., 2013). While results from these studies show that 
attributes of electricity suppliers such as price, length of contract, reliability of supply, share of 
renewables, discounts, and type of supplier (e.g., Goett et al., 2000; Hensher et al., 2014) are 
important determinants of supplier choice, other factors such as attitudes, past experience, 
perceived barriers, and socio-demographic characteristics of consumers also play an important 
role in consumer switching (Electricity Authority, 2010; Gamble et al., 2007, 2009).  
In this paper we model consumer switching in retail electricity markets in New Zealand to: (1) 
identify important determinants of switching and estimate WTP for a selected subset of non-
price attributes of electricity services, namely, call waiting time, length of fixed rate contract, 
proportion of renewables in the fuel mix, loyalty rewards, ownership of supplier, and supplier 
type; (2) explore the existence of market segments with clearly distinct preferences for the 
attributes and use a psychological construct based on the theory of planned behaviour to explain 
preference heterogeneity across preference classes; and (3) explain switching inertia in terms 
of the status quo effect and preferences for non-price attributes. A novel latent class approach 
to modelling consumer switching is adopted where sensitivity to power bill savings is allowed 
to vary within and across the latent preference classes. This is achieved by specifying utility as 
a piecewise linear function of the savings variable. In this regard, this paper contributes to the 
limited literature on consumer switching in retail electricity markets and increases our 
understanding of consumer preferences for the attributes of electricity services.  
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 provides a brief literature review. 
Section 3 briefly describes the “What’s My Number” campaign used to promote switching in 
New Zealand. Section 4 describes the method and provides a brief overview of choice 
experiment approach and describes in detail our choice experiment and survey development. 
Section 5 presents the empirical results, and Section 6 outlines our main conclusions.  
2. Literature review 
Early studies of consumer switching or preferences and WTP for the attributes of electricity 
services were conducted during the initial stages of deregulation of retail electricity markets. 
Their main objective was to provide insight on the attributes that would influence consumer 
switching, and how new entrants would affect incumbent retailer’s market share (e.g., Cai et 
al., 1998; Goett, 1998; Goett et al., 2000; Revelt & Train, 2000). Since the market data required 
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for this type of analysis was nonexistent, these studies relied on stated preference data 
generated from choice experiments (CEs), where each respondent was presented with several 
hypothetical, yet realistic offers by energy suppliers and asked to choose his/her preferred offer.  
The stated preference approach has also been adopted in recent studies of consumer switching 
(e.g., Amador et al., 2013; Bae & Rishi, 2018; Cardella et al., 2017; Hensher et al., 2014; 
Kaenzig et al., 2013). However, some recent studies have adopted a different approach by using 
revealed preference data on consumers actual behaviour to investigate consumer switching in 
deregulated markets (e.g., Daglish, 2016; Giulietti et al., 2014; Hortaçsu et al., 2017; Rutter et 
al., 2018). The motivation for recent studies stems from observed consumer inertia across all 
jurisdictions with deregulated electricity markets, where switching rates are below expectation 
despite large price differences and reduced search costs (Giulietti et al., 2014). Both stated 
preference and revealed preference studies find that consumers attach significant value to non-
price attributes which may play an important role in consumers’ switching decisions. However, 
no stated preference study on consumer switching based on CEs has been conducted in New 
Zealand, a jurisdiction with the highest switching rates in the world.   
The advantage of revealed preference over stated preference studies is that they use market 
data rather than responses to hypothetical questions. However, the main drawback of revealed 
preference studies on consumer switching is that market data on some relevant attributes is 
limited or missing, and variability of the data is also limited resulting in large sample sizes 
required to estimate the individual effects of the attributes. For example, data on consumer 
switching is often at an aggregate rather than individual-level and may not include all relevant 
attribute information considered by consumers in making their switching decisions, and/or 
individual-level socio-demographic characteristics of the consumers. Furthermore, revealed 
preference data does not include attitudinal data, such as, consumers’ attitudes, perceptions and 
experiences which have been shown to be important determinants of consumer switching (see, 
Gamble et al., 2009). Consequently, revealed preference studies have focused mainly on price, 
brand value, search cost, market share, and average consumption. Although some revealed 
preference studies have included socio-demographic characteristics obtained by linking 
electricity meter addresses to census block group data (e.g., Daglish, 2016; Hortaçsu et al., 
2017), none of these studies have included attitudinal variables in choice models.  
Through carefully designed survey instruments, stated preference studies can cover a wider 
range of attributes, and collect accurate individual-level information on socio-demographic 
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characteristics and attitudes (Johnston et al., 2017). However, few CE studies of consumer 
switching have included attitudinal data in the estimated models despite the wide acceptance 
of the notion that attitudes influence consumer behaviour. For example, Amador et al. (2013) 
use a Likert-type scale to measure “concern” about greenhouse gas emissions from electricity 
generation, and interact this variable with an attribute measuring the proportion of renewables 
in the fuel mix to explain differences in WTP for green electricity. The theoretical basis for this 
measure of “concern” and how the relevant attitudinal question is developed is unclear. 
Strazzera et al. (2012) combine data from a CE with psychometric scales to identify and explain 
factors that explain support for wind energy development. As in Amador et al. (2013), the 
statements used are not linked to any specific theory, which questions the validity of the 
attitudinal measures. However, a latent class analysis of their data shows that membership to 
preference classes depends on psychometric variables.   
Hawcroft and Milfont (2010) show that the use of arbitrary constructs is pervasive and argue 
that this practice limits comparability of results from different studies. Our paper differs from 
these studies by using a psychological contract based on a well-established attitude-behaviour 
theory (see section 4.2). However, we adopt a similar approach to Strazzera et al. (2012) by 
estimating a latent class model in which attitudinal responses are used as explanatory variables 
in the class membership model rather than interactions with the attributes of alternatives. 
Recent valuation studies in other fields show that measurement errors occur when 
scores/indicators obtained from Likert-type scales are used as direct measures of latent 
variables. The direct use of these indicators in choice models as interactions with design 
attributes raises endogeneity concerns (Hess & Beharry-Borg, 2012). The state-of-the-art 
approach to integrating attitudinal and choice data in discrete choice models involves the 
estimation of hybrid choice models. These models overcome the endogeneity problem by 
treating responses to attitudinal and choice questions as dependent variables driven by the same 
underlying latent variable(s) but are complex and come at a high computational cost.2            
3. Consumer switching in New Zealand retail electricity markets 
New Zealand introduced retail competition in 1998, under the Electricity Industry Reform Act 
1998. The main objective of the Act was “to increase consumer choice, encourage innovation, 
                                                          
2 A detailed discussion of hybrid model such as the integrated choice and latent variable model is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Readers interested in these models may refer to  Hess and Beharry-Borg (2012), Ben-Akiva 
et al. (2002) for detailed discussions.  
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and ultimately result in lower prices than would otherwise be charged” (Electricity Authority, 
2010, p. 3). In 2009, a ministerial review of the performance of the electricity market 
determined that consumer switching rates were insufficient to curb non-competitive behaviour 
by retailers and that the full benefits of retail competition had not yet been realised, particularly 
for domestic customers (Electricity Authority, 2010). It was observed that most electricity 
customers exhibited a tendency to stay with their default retailers even when cheaper 
competitors were available. The ministerial review also determined that consumers could be 
better off by as much as NZ$150 million per annum, in total savings, if they switched to the 
cheapest available retailer (Electricity Authority, 2011). The estimated welfare benefits from 
switching were large enough to justify the establishment of a public funded “Consumer 
Switching Fund” for NZ$15 million to promote switching (Electricity Authority, 2010) through 
the “What’s My Number”  campaign and related activities. In 2010 the estimated total benefit 
from switching to the cheapest retailer was NZ$240 million, reflecting rapidly increasing retail 
price differences. However, the above welfare benefit estimates were based on the seemingly 
unrealistic assumption of price convergence in retail electricity markets.  
From 2011 to 2014 the “What’s My Number” campaign was used as the main instrument for 
promoting switching. During this campaign period, consumers were made aware of their ability 
to switch and of the benefits (savings) from switching. The publicized benefits averaged 
NZ$150 per customer per year (Electricity Authority, 2011, 2012b). An independent one-stop-
shop website called “Powerswitch” was revamped to provide consumers easy access to a single 
central switching service (Electricity Authority, 2010).  
International studies show that factors such as lack of information, perceived information 
search costs and low economic benefits from switching, attitudes, and loyalty to incumbent 
supplier, among others, may prevent consumers from switching to the cheapest supplier (e.g., 
Gamble et al., 2007, 2009; Gärling et al., 2008; Giulietti et al., 2005; Rowlands et al., 2004). 
The “What’s My Number” campaign and “Powerswitch” appear to have been targeted at 
addressing the first three issues while ignoring the rest.   
Several local studies were commissioned under the “Consumer Switching Fund” to provide 
Electricity Authority and Ministry of Consumer Affairs with research that underpins the Fund 
(see, Electricity Authority, 2010), and to assess the performance of the “What’s My Number” 
campaign and “Powerswitch” website (Electricity Authority, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 
2013b). These studies indicate that annual switching rates in New Zealand increased from 
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10.5% in 2009 to 20.8% in 2013. By 2011, New Zealand had the second highest switching 
rates  in the world after Victoria, Australia, and became first in 2012-2014 (VaasaETT, 2013). 
New Zealand authorities attribute this increase in switching to the “What’s My Number” 
campaign and related regulation, and to the market entry by several new suppliers. In New 
Zealand consumers can choose among 8 to 18 retailer brands depending on their region.  
Although the above studies show an increase in switching activity during the campaign period, 
they also show that around 80% of consumers did not switch in any particular year, despite 
substantial savings in the market (see Table 1). Furthermore, the combined market share for 
the top five retailers (the ‘Big 5’) has remained high at 95%, similarly to most  jurisdictions in 
Europe (see, Defeuilley, 2009; Giulietti et al., 2010) suggesting that consumer switching has 
been mainly between the ‘Big 5’.   
Table 1: Switching rates and economic benefits (2011-2013).1  
 Year 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
Average annual household savings (NZ$)  $165 $175 $155 $162 
Switching rate  20.7% 19.1% 20.8% 22.7% 
Potential national savings (NZ$ million)1  $280 $295 $267 $275 
1Based on the assumption that all customers switched to the cheapest available retailer in their region 
(Source: Electricity Authority, 2013c, 2016) 
 
At the time of this research, the Electricity Authority was consulting on ways to increase 
consumer propensity to switch, which indicated a need for more research into consumer 
preferences. Assuming reduced search cost due to “What’s My Number” campaign and 
“Powerswitch” website and, high potential savings from switching, lower than expected 
switching rates, and results from reviewed international literature, we hypothesize that non-
price attributes of electricity services are important determinants of switching (Hypothesis I). 
Cai et al. (1998) show that consumers switch supplier at different discount thresholds 
suggesting that a consumer will switch supplier when potential or perceived economic benefits 
exceed a certain threshold. Based on these findings, we postulate a non-linear marginal utility 
structure for power bill savings (Hypothesis II), which may, in part explain why some 
consumers have not switched supplier.     
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4. Methods.     
In this paper we adopt a stated preference approach because market data is unavailable. The 
main stated preference approaches used in previous valuation studies are the contingent 
valuation method (CVM) and stated choice experiments (CEs). Both approaches elicit 
consumer preferences through hypothetical choices elicited by asking respondents to choose 
their preferred option among alternatives described in terms of attribute levels and price.  
The stated CE technique is preferred to the CVM given the multi-attribute valuation context 
and objectives of this paper. This technique has been used in previous studies investigating 
WTP for the attributes of electricity services (e.g., Abdullah & Mariel, 2010; Amador et al., 
2013; Goett et al., 2000; Kaenzig et al., 2013).  
The model of consumer switching developed in this paper includes, among other variables, a 
psychological construct based on the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1988, 1991) to 
explain preference heterogeneity across preference classes. The theory of planned behaviour 
and its application is discussed in section 4.2.     
4.1. An overview of choice experiments (CEs).  
Stated CEs are widely used to study individual preferences in the fields of transportation, 
marketing, health and environmental economics, because of their ability to mimic decisions 
observed in real markets. Studies employing CEs provide insight regarding the determinants 
of consumer choice and allow researchers to introduce new attributes or even vary attribute 
levels beyond those available in the market. 
Stated preferences are elicited using a series of constructed hypothetical choice situations in 
which two or more alternatives are described in terms of attribute levels and respondents are 
asked to select their preferred option (Adamowicz et al., 1995; Hanley et al., 2001; Louviere 
et al., 2000). The attribute levels of the alternatives, except for the status quo, are varied by the 
researcher, based on an experimental design, to provide the variation needed for estimating the 
underlying preference parameters.  
To allow for the estimation of marginal WTP values for the attributes, a cost attribute is 
included in each alternative. By selecting the preferred alternative in each choice task, a 
respondent implicitly makes trade-offs between the attribute levels of alternatives (Bennett & 
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Adamowicz, 2001; Hensher et al., 2005; Louviere et al., 2000). The series of choices made by 
respondents give rise to a panel of discrete choices used in model estimation. Previous 
valuation literature provide evidence that experimental choice-based methodologies can 
produce accurate predictions of actual choice decisions (e.g., Burke et al., 1992; Huber & 
Zwerina, 1996; List et al., 2006).     
Stated CEs allow researchers to uncover respondents’ preferences for the attributes of a 
scenario rather than preferences for a specific scenario as a whole. Adamowicz et al. (1995) 
argue that the CE technique provides a richer description of the attribute trade-offs that 
individuals are willing to make compared to the CVM. The CE technique has a number of 
advantages over the CVM such as, smaller sample sizes, reduced strategic behaviour and “yea-
saying”, avoids explicit elicitation of respondents’ WTP, and provides an internal scope test 
(see, Hanley et al., 2001; Holmes & Adamowicz, 2003; Willis, 2006). Its drawbacks include 
placing a heavier cognitive burden on respondents, as they are required to evaluate larger or 
more complex choice sets, and the high level of complexity involved in the experimental 
design. Cognitive burden on respondents may affect the quality of responses, which in turn 
affects the validity and reliability of the results.     
A challenge with the CE technique involves the design of the CEs. Experimental design is the 
way in which the attribute levels of alternatives are set and structured into the choice sets 
(Bennett & Adamowicz, 2001). Experimental design is complex, time consuming, and can 
heavily influence the outcomes (validity and reliability) and conclusions of the research (see, 
Hensher et al., 2005; Louviere et al., 2008). Researchers rely on literature review, expert 
opinion and focus groups in developing their experimental designs (Johnston et al., 2017).  
4.2. The theory of planned behaviour 
We use a psychological construct based on the theory of planned behaviour to explain 
differences in switching behaviour among residential electricity consumers. The theory of 
planned behaviour posits that, a person’s intention to perform a behaviour (behavioural 
intention, or BI) is the immediate determinant of that behaviour (Ajzen, 1988, 1991). Ajzen 
(1988, 2005) and, Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) provide a detailed discussion of the theory of 
planned behaviour. Based on this theory we postulate that an electricity consumer’s intention 
to switch supplier (BI) is the immediate determinant of switching (i.e. behaviour), that is, we 
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expect BI, among other variables, to explain differences in switching behaviour in the sampled 
population (Hypothesis III).  
To develop the question and statement used to measure BI we followed the procedure 
recommended by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) and (Ajzen, 1988). The question and statement 
used to assess BI are presented in Table 2. Response categories were points on a 7-point bipolar 
Likert scale. 
Table 2: Question and statement used to measure behavioural intentions (BI).1 
1. How likely or unlikely is it that you will switch to a supplier offering a better package of price and 
services in the next 12 months? 
2. I intend to switch to a supplier offering a better package of price and services in the next 12 months. 
1Likert scale points were marked as “extremely unlikely, quite unlikely, slightly unlikely, neither likely 
nor unlikely, slightly likely, quite likely, extremely likely”, and “strongly disagree, quite disagree, 
slightly disagree, neither agree nor disagree, slightly agree, quite agree, strongly agree” for 1 and 2 
respectively. These points were coded as -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
 
4.3. Study design  
4.3.1. Survey questionnaire 
An online questionnaire was developed to collect the data required for this research. The first 
part of the questionnaire consisted of an introduction and screening questions. This was 
followed by questions eliciting information on socio-demographic characteristics, BI, and 
sensitivity to power bill savings, among others. BI was measured using a question and a 
statement, with responses marked on an evaluative semantic differential scale (see Table 2.) 
Sensitivity to power bill savings refers to the stated minimum level of power bill savings that 
would have been sufficient to induce switching supplier(s) in the past 24 months.   
Sensitivity to power bill savings was ascertained for each respondent based on a series of 
questions similar to those used in the iterative bidding game format in contingent valuation 
studies. Initially all respondents were asked if they would have switched supplier in the past 
24 months if they could have saved NZ$100 per year on their power bills. Respondents who 
answered “No” were progressively presented with NZ$100 increments in power bill savings as 
shown in Table 3. A set of indicator variables Switchd = (Switch1, Switch2, Switch3, Switch4) 
was used to capture responses (1 if Yes, 0 if No) to questions, 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 
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Table 3: Consumer sensitivity to power bill savings. 
Question Yes No 
 Responses % Responses % 
1. Would you have switched supplier in the past 24 months if it 
could have saved you NZ$100 per year on your power bill? 
139 62 85 38 
2. Now suppose you could have saved NZ$200 per year, 
would you have switched supplier in the past 24 months? 
45 20 40 18 
3. How about a saving of NZ$300 per year, would you have 
switched supplier in the past 24 months? 
18 8 22 10 
4. What about saving NZ$400 per year, could this have been 
enough to make you switch supplier in the past 24 months? 
If not, please state the minimum amount of savings per year 
that would have been enough to persuade you to switch 
11 5 11 5 
Respondents stating NZ$500 as their minimum are recoded as 
“Yes” to $500 and the rest as “No” 
6 3 5 2 
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of average annual power bill savings across 16 main regions in 
New Zealand during 2014. The selected range of values used to test sensitivity to power bill 
savings spans over the range of values achievable at the time the survey was conducted. 
Although the highest average savings was below NZ$350, higher values of NZ$400 and 
NZ$500 were used to test sensitivity of the most reluctant switchers. 
The third part of the survey questionnaire elicited information on respondents’ choices among 




Figure 1: Average annual residential power bill savings in New Zealand during 2014.  
(Source: Adapted from Electricity Authority, 2016). 
 
4.3.2. Attribute selection and experimental design 
In this study, residential electricity customers were presented with a series of 12 choice tasks, 
which were the same for all respondents. Each choice task consisted of three alternatives, a 
reference alternative (status quo) represented by an incumbent traditional retailer and two 
experimentally designed generic alternatives representing competitors, who were either new 
non-traditional entrants or other traditional retailers. Each task required respondents to decide 
whether to switch or not given the attribute levels of the alternatives.  
The identification and selection of important attributes and attribute levels used in the 
experimental design (see Table 4) was based on previous New Zealand studies (e.g., Electricity 
Authority, 2010, 2011, 2012a; Ministry of Economic Development, 2005a), international 
13 
 
literature review and four focus groups.3 Results from the latter were similar to those from the 
nation-wide surveys. These studies used importance statements to identify and rank 15 most 
important attributes of electricity services considered by consumers in deciding to switch. The 
attributes used in the experimental design were selected from the 10 most important attributes 
identified in these studies and focus groups. The selected attributes fall into the following 
categories representing potential key drivers of switching in New Zealand: pricing and contract, 
loyalty rewards, local ownership of supplier, green energy attributes, customer service (call 
waiting time - Time), and supplier type. International literature also provides support for the 
selection of the attributes in our final list (e.g., Amador et al., 2013; Goett et al., 2000; Kaenzig 
et al., 2013).  
 
                                                          
3 Focus groups consisted of 8-10 participants recruited through interception by the lead author at two locations 
in Hamilton East, New Zealand. To qualify, participants had to be at least 18 years old and be responsible for 
paying their power bills or have a say in choosing their electricity supplier.  
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Table 4:  Attributes, attribute levels and design codes used to develop the experimental design.  
Attributes Description Levels Pivot Design Codes 
Time Average time for telephone calls to be answered by a 
customer service representative (continuous) 
0, 5,10, 15 (minutes)  -5, 0, 5, 10 
Fixed Length of time over which prices are guaranteed (continuous) 0, 12, 24, 36 (months)  0, 12, 24, 36 
Discount Discount for paying electricity bill on time including online 
prompt payments (continuous) 
(0%, 10%, 20%, 30%) -10, 0, 10, 20 
Rewards Loyalty rewards such as Fly Buys, Brownie points, prize 
draws, and annual account credits (excludes annual network 





Renewable Proportion of electricity generated from wind, hydro, 
geothermal, bioenergy and solar (continuous). 
(25%, 50%, 75%, 100%) -25, 0, 25,50 
Ownership %NZ ownership of supplier(continuous)  25%, 50%, 75%, 100% -25, 0, 25, 50 
Supplier Type Type of supplier (dummy variable) New electricity company 
New non-electricity company 
Well-known electricity supplier 







Average monthly electricity bill before GST, levy and 
discounts (NZ$) (continuous).  
 
$150, $200, $250, $300 
 
-100, -50, 0, 50 
Non-experimental design variables used in model estimation 
Savings                          Continuous variable measuring implied savings from switching from current supplier to a competitor   
Switch1_Savings            Interaction term between Savings and Switch1  
Switch2_Savings            Interaction term between Savings and Switch2 
Switch3_Savings            Interaction term between Savings and Switch3  
Switch4_Savings            Interaction term between Savings and Switch4  
Behavioural Intention   This variable is the average score for BI as defined in Table 2 
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The attribute level range for each of the selected attributes was based on publicly available 
information on electricity retailers’ websites. A list of these attributes was sent to all the major 
retailers who were asked to provide levels for each attribute. A unanimous response from 
retailers was that all attribute level information (except Time) was available on their respective 
websites. The range for Time was ascertained through repeated calls to retailers’ customer 
service and recoding the time (minutes) it took to speak to a customer service representative. 
Average Time for each retailer was recorded, which provided the range used in the 
experimental design. The attribute level units for all attributes are based on similar previous 
studies. For example, the share of generation from renewables was measured as a percentage 
of the fuel mix (e.g., Amador et al., 2013; Borchers et al., 2007; Goett et al., 2000; Kaenzig et 
al., 2013), cost was measured as monthly power bill (e.g., Amador et al., 2013; Goett et al., 
2000). Discount (e.g., Goett et al., 2000) and ownership (e.g., Electricity Authority, 2011) were 
measured as percentages, while fixed price contract was measured in months, and supplier type 
(e.g., Kaenzig et al., 2013) and loyalty rewards were dummy coded. 
A sequential orthogonal design with three unlabelled alternatives was developed as an initial 
design using NGENE 1.1.0 software and tested on a focus group.4 Experimental design 
literature provides detailed discussions of different types of designs and their pros and cons 
(e.g., Bennett & Adamowicz, 2001; Burgess & Street, 2003, 2005; Huber & Zwerina, 1996; 
Louviere et al., 2000).  
An advantage of orthogonal designs is that they do not require any prior information about the 
parameters of the model. Their drawback is that they fail to utilize available information such 
as estimates of parameters from related studies (see, Ferrini & Scarpa, 2007; Huber & Zwerina, 
1996; Scarpa & Rose, 2008) and plausible assumptions about the signs of the parameters. In 
this paper this design strategy is only used at the initial stage, later made more efficient by a 
sequential updating process in which a series of designs are generated and tested based on the 
cumulative information available at each stage. The sequential updating of the experimental 
design used a D-error minimizing homogenous pivot design for an MNL model where each 
                                                          
4 A sequential orthogonal design is an orthogonal fractional factorial design approach where an orthogonal 
design for the first alternative is created and subsequent alternatives are generated by re-arranging the rows of 
the first alternative in such a way that the levels of any two attributes of an alternative are uncorrelated, i.e., 
orthogonal (ChoiceMetrics, 2012). A design is orthogonal if the sum of the inner product of any two design 
columns (or attributes) is zero, i.e., the attributes of the design are independent of each other or uncorrelated 
(Bliemer & Rose, 2011; ChoiceMetrics, 2012). 
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respondent faces the same reference alternative.5 The design was tested on a pilot sample of 70 
respondents drawn from an online panel of bill-payers. Data from the pilot survey was used to 
estimate an MNL model. For the final survey, the parameter estimates from the pilot survey 
were used as priors in a Bayesian D-error minimizing main effects design consisting of seven 
attributes with four levels each and one attribute with two levels6. A fractional factorial design 
was used to reduce the number of choice sets from 32,768 (47x21) to 12, which satisfied the 
degrees of freedom (11) for the design. Ferrini and Scarpa (2007) and Scarpa and Rose (2008) 
contend that Bayesian efficient designs are less sensitive to misspecification of the priors 
compared to designs based on fixed priors.  
The final survey was administered in January 2014 to bill-payers sampled from an online panel 
managed by a leading market research company in New Zealand. A target sample of 224 usable 
responses was achieved overnight highlighting one of the appeals of crowd sourcing or online 
labour pools.7 The experimental design described above was optimized for our sample size, 
which was constrained by a limited data collection budget. However, we took advantage of 
repeated sampling i.e., each respondent provided 12 data points resulting in 2,688 choice 
responses. Simulation of the experimental design revealed that a sample size of 200 was 
adequate for the identification of the individual effects of the attributes.  
A drawback for online surveys is the incomplete and potentially biased sample frame since 
panel members are originally recruited through non-probabilistic methods, and the exclusion 
of large sections of the population particularly where internet penetration rates are low. New 
Zealand has an internet penetration rate of more than 84.5% and is ranked 12th in the world 
(Internet World Stats, 2012), which justifies the use of an online labour pool for this study8. 
Screening questions were used to ensure that participants met the following criteria: New 
Zealand resident, at least 18 years old, and responsible for paying the bills or had a say in 
choosing their electricity supplier. Quotas were set for age, gender, income, regional population 
                                                          
5 Focus groups and pre-test revealed that participants had difficulty figuring out the exact attribute levels for 
their current supplier and that a homogeneous pivot design with a reference alternative described using the 
market average for the attribute levels would reduce the complexity of the choice tasks.  
6 Main effects designs do not include interaction terms. 
7 Usable responses include answers to the choice questions. Respondents who did not meet the screening criteria 
to participate were screed out before answering the choice questions. Their incomplete responses are not usable 
and are excluded from the sample. 
8 For detailed discussions on the pros and cons of crowd sourcing, interested readers are referred to recent studies 
such as Casey et al., (2017), Gosling and Mason (2015), Sharpe et al. (2017). 
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and ethnicity to ensure that a representative sample, based on NZ 2006 Census statistics, was 
drawn from the online panel.  
Before answering the choice questions, respondents were advised that the scenarios were used 
to understand how people would switch from their electricity suppliers under different 
conditions. In each scenario, respondents were asked to compare two experimentally designed 
alternative suppliers, “Supplier A” and “Supplier B”, with the status quo labelled as “Your 
Current Supplier”, and indicate whether they would switch if conditions described in each 









                                                                                                                                                                         
 
Figure 2: Stated choice scenario and example of a choice task. 
 
4.4. Model specification 
We use the multinomial logit (MNL) and latent class (LC) models to analyse the choice data 
(MNL is used as a base model). These models are based on the random utility maximization 
(RUM) theory (McFadden, 1974). Although integrated choice and latent variable models and 
mixed logit models account for unobserved heterogeneity of preferences, they do not identify 
preference classes. We use the LC choice model to identify latent groups with similar 
preferences. In this application of the LC model, we assume that the population consists of a 
In the scenarios that follow please only consider the information provided in deciding whether to 
switch supplier or not. Assume that any information not provided is the same for the three suppliers. 
Which supplier would you prefer? 
    ASPECT Your Current 
Supplier 
Supplier A Supplier B 
Call waiting time     15 minutes 15 minutes 0 minutes     
Fixed rate guarantee      0 months 36 months 0 months     
Prompt payment discount      10% 0% 20%     
Loyalty rewards      No No Yes     
Electricity supplied from RENEWABLE sources 50% 100% 75%     
NZ ownership      100% 100% 50%     
  








company     
Average monthly electricity bill      $250 ($225 after 
discount) 
$250 $200 ($160 after 
discount)   




finite number of preference classes (C) with respect to the attributes of electricity services. 
When C = 1, the LC model collapses into an MNL.   
We follow standard procedure and specify a class-specific utility function consisting of a 
deterministic component (𝜷𝜷𝑐𝑐′ 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) related to the attributes of the supplier, which include the 
cost element, and a random component (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝑐𝑐) as follows (see, Boxall & Adamowicz, 2002; 
Walker & Ben-Akiva, 2002): 
 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝑐𝑐 = 𝜷𝜷𝑐𝑐′ 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝑐𝑐                                  (1) 
where Uint|c is the utility of supplier i to individual n in choice situation t conditional on class c 
membership; xint is a matrix of all attributes of suppliers and socio-demographic characteristics 
that appear in all utility functions including an alternative-specific constant for the status quo 
(incumbent traditional supplier); εint|c is identically and independently distributed (IID) with 
Extreme Value Type 1 (Gumbel-distributed) error component that captures unobserved 
heterogeneity (Train, 2009) for individual n and supplier i in choice situation t conditional on 
class c membership; and βʹc is a class-specific parameter vector to be estimated.9 Equation (1) 
assumes that respondents in each class have the same marginal utility of income and similar 
preferences with respect to non-price attributes. Omitting the subscript c from Equation (1) 
provides a utility function for the MNL.   
The parameters of a standard LC model are modelled as having a discrete distribution with a 
small number of support points (Kamakura & Russell, 1989). An individual n is viewed as 
belonging to a latent class which is not revealed to the researcher. The unconditional probability 
that an individual n switches to supplier i can be expressed as a product of two probabilities 
(Kamakura & Russell): 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ �
exp (𝜶𝜶𝑐𝑐′𝑺𝑺𝑛𝑛)
∑ expCc=1 (𝜶𝜶𝑐𝑐′𝑺𝑺𝑛𝑛)




�𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐=1  , c =1, 2, ….. , C; 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶 = 0; ∀ 𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗             (2) 
 where  exp (𝜶𝜶𝑐𝑐
′𝑺𝑺𝑛𝑛)
∑ expCc=1 (𝜶𝜶𝑐𝑐′𝑺𝑺𝑛𝑛)
 is the cth class membership probability of individual n with socio-
demographic characteristics Sn including BI, defined parametrically using a multinomial logit 
as membership equation; 𝜶𝜶𝑐𝑐′  is a vector of class-specific parameters, which is a zero vector for 
                                                          
9 Socio-demographic characteristics may enter the utility function as interactions with choice attributes or 
alternative-specific constants.  
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 represents the conditional probability of an individual 
n in class c switching to supplier i, and βʹc as defined before. Following Morey et al. (2006), 
we assume that class membership is a function of socio-demographic characteristics including 
behavioural intention (BI).10 However, based on the basic Heckman and Singer model, the 
class-specific probabilities may be a set of fixed constants if no observable characteristics that 
help in class separation are observed (Heckman & Singer, 1984). The second term in Equation 
(2) provides the logit choice probability for the MNL model where subscript c is suppressed 
and the first term is equal to 1 since C = 1 in the case of an MNL model.11   
For a sequence of choices 𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖 =   {𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖1,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖2, … … . ,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛}, the log likelihood for the sample may 
be expressed as:  
ln 𝐿𝐿 = ∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 �∑
exp (𝜶𝜶𝑐𝑐′𝑺𝑺𝑛𝑛)









𝑐𝑐=1 �                            (3)  
We maximize the likelihood with respect to the C structural parameter vector βʹc and the C-1 
latent class parameter vector 𝜶𝜶𝑐𝑐′ . Since the βc’s which include the coefficient of the cost element 
(monthly power bill) vary across classes, the LC model identifies heterogeneity in the 
consumers’ values of the attributes of the suppliers, which would be obscured in a single 
average measure with the MNL. The number of latent classes cannot be determined a priori 
and there is no theory to guide the setting of the initial number of classes. Previous studies have 
relied on information criteria such as Akaike information criteria (AIC), AIC3, corrected AIC 
(crAIC), consistent AIC (CAIC) and Bayesian information criteria (BIC) to determine the 
number of classes (Morey et al., 2006; Morey et al., 2008). Andrews and Currim (2003), Morey 
et al. (2006), and Yang and Yang (2007) discuss the performance of these criteria and also 
provide formulae for their calculation.   
To capture the systematic effect of consumer sensitivity to the level of savings on switching 
behaviour we modify the utility function in Equation (1) by employing an indirect utility 
specification similar to that suggested by Morey et al. (2003), which uses a piecewise linear 
formulation for the power bill savings parameter. In this formulation, the utility of savings is 
                                                          
10 Including BI in the class membership probability in Equation (2) may introduce endogeneity bias. This is 
investigated by estimating an alternative model using a two-stage sequential approach in which fitted values of 
BI are used in the class membership model (e.g., Strazzera et al., 2012). 




assumed to be a step function of power bill savings. This approach allows us to explore 
differences in preferences for consumers with different power bill savings sensitivities instead 
of estimating a single parameter for the savings variable, which would imply homogeneous 
preferences among customers (Hypothesis II). Nonlinear effects of continuous variables such 
as income have been studied in the past and the evidence suggests that incorporating such 
effects in random utility maximization models improves model fit and provides estimates of 
marginal utility of income that are more intuitive than assuming constant marginal utility (see, 
Goett et al., 2000; Herriges & Kling, 1999; Layton & Lee, 2006).   








′ 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝑐𝑐   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ1 = 1; ∀ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑑𝑑 = 0
𝛾𝛾2𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ2−𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝜷𝑐𝑐′ 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝑐𝑐  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ2 = 1; ∀ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑑𝑑 = 0
𝛾𝛾3𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ3−𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝜷𝑐𝑐′ 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝑐𝑐  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ3 = 1; ∀ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑑𝑑 = 0
𝛾𝛾4𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ4−𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝜷𝑐𝑐′ 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝑐𝑐  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ4 = 1; ∀ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑑𝑑 = 0
   (1ʹ)  
where 𝛾𝛾1𝑐𝑐 , … , 𝛾𝛾4𝑐𝑐 are the class-specific marginal utilities of savings for respondents who would 
switch supplier at NZ$100, NZ$200, NZ$300 and NZ$400+ levels of savings, respectively (see 
Table 3), x is a K×1 vector of non-price attributes including x = 1 for the alternative specific 
constant for the status quo alternative, βʹc and εint|c are as defined before, and d = 1, 2, 3, 4. 
Based on Equation (1ʹ), we re-specify Equation (2) and (3) as follows:  
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ �
exp (𝜶𝜶𝑐𝑐′𝑺𝑺𝑛𝑛)
∑ expCc=1 (𝜶𝜶𝑐𝑐′𝑺𝑺𝑛𝑛)
� � exp (𝛾𝛾𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑑𝑑_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖+ 𝜷𝜷𝑐𝑐
′𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖)
∑ expJj=1 (𝛾𝛾𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑑𝑑_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖+ 𝜷𝜷𝑐𝑐
′𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖)
�𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐=1 , d = 1, 2, 3, 4                        (2ʹ) 
ln 𝐿𝐿 = ∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 �∑
exp (𝜶𝜶𝑐𝑐′𝑺𝑺𝑛𝑛)
∑ exp (𝜶𝜶𝑐𝑐′𝑺𝑺𝑛𝑛)𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐=1
∏ exp (𝛾𝛾𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑑𝑑_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖+ 𝜷𝜷𝑐𝑐
′𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖)











5.1. Sample statistics and behavioural intentions  
Key demographic and income characteristics of our sample are presented in Table 5. Our 
sample resembles the national population in terms of gender, age-group, and income-group. 
The average personal income of respondents (NZ$45,000) is higher than the national average 
of NZ$37,500. The difference may be due to the inclusion of a low-income age-group (15-17 
years) in the national average. In terms of ethnicity, Maori are under-represented whilst NZ 
Europeans are over-represented, which may also explain the higher sample average income as 
NZ Europeans are likely to earn more. The sample average monthly electricity bill is lower 
than the national average, which is expected as the national average is over winter and summer 
months, whereas the survey was conducted in summer. 
Table 5: Sample statistics versus national population. 
 Characteristics Sample (N = 224) National1 
Gender Male 47% 49% 
Female 53% 51% 
Age group 18 – 24 yrs. 13% 13% 
25 – 34 yrs. 17% 17% 
35 – 44 yrs. 20% 21% 
45 – 54 yrs. 18% 18% 
55 + yrs. 32% 31% 
Ethnicity NZ European  77% 70% 
 Maori  5% 12% 
Asian 9% 10% 
Other 9% 7% 
Average personal income NZ$45,000 NZ$37,500 
Average monthly electricity bill NZ$174 NZ$190* 
1Data source: NZ Statistics – 2006 Census Data and NZ Income Survey: June 2012 quarter. *MED 
Energy Data File 2012. 
 
Responses to the behavioural intention (BI) statements listed in Table 2 are summarized in 
Figure 3. The results show that at least 31% of respondents expressed no intentions of switching 
supplier in the next 12 months indicating the presence of “consumer stickiness”. On average, 
38% intended to switch. This percentage is slightly higher than the most recent observed 
switching rate of 30% indicating a possibility for higher switching rates in the future. Only 
21% of respondents had switched supplier in the past 24 months. The average score for BI is -
0.02, indicating that on average respondents are neutral to switching and that higher switching 
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rates may be achieved through switching campaigns aimed at changing consumers’ behavioural 
intentions towards switching. In the next subsection, the individual BI scores are used in the 
class membership equation and improve the LC model.12 
 
1. How likely or unlikely is it that you will 
switch to a supplier offering a better 
package of price and services in the next 12 
months? 
2. I intend to switch to a supplier offering a 
better package of price and services in the 
next 12 months. 
  
Figure 3: Distribution of responses on behavioural intentions (BI). 
5.2. Estimation results 
Preliminary estimations of the LC models with socio-demographic characteristics in the class 
membership model revealed that these variables are poor predictors of membership of 
preference class. Estimation results for the final estimated models are presented in Table 6. 
Model (M1) is the standard MNL model. Models (M2) and (M3) are LC models. M2 and M3 
differ in that the class membership sub-model in M2 is the Heckman and Singer (1984) model, 
which assumes that all parameters are the same across classes except for the class-specific 
constants, whilst the psychological construct BI is used to sharpen class membership in M3. 
Models M1 and M2 are used for comparison purposes and testing hypotheses II and III. All 
three models are based on the utility function specified in Equation (1ʹ) to account for 
individual sensitivity to power bill savings.13  
                                                          
12 To account for the panel nature of the choice dataset, a panel LC model is estimated. The log-likelihood 
maximized is for the panel of discrete responses, which are hence correlated by the same utility coefficients, so 
correlation across responses by the same individual is accounted for and no clustering is necessary.  
13 The results of an MNL model (M0) and LC model (M4) based on the utility function specified in Equation (1) 
which assumes a single parameter for power bill savings are presented in Table B.1 in the Appendix. 
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The models were estimated using NLOGIT 5 software, and the data was coded for attribute 
non-attendance to account for ignored attributes as recommended in the literature (see, Hensher 
et al., 2012). 
As previously noted, the number of classes retained in a latent class model “is exogenously 
defined and outside the space of estimable parameters” (Scarpa & Thiene, 2005, p. 434), hence 
we base our model selection on information criteria and other factors such as the pattern of 
significant parameters and relative signs, ease of interpreting the results, parsimony and the 
need to avoid over-fitting the model. Information criteria indicate the presence of three or four 
classes with clearly distinct preferences for the attributes of electricity services. The CAIC and 
BIC indicate that only three classes may be retained whilst Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
(HQC), AIC, crAIC and CAIC3 indicate four classes (see Appendix A). The model with three 
classes is selected based on CAIC and BIC, which have been found to have a tendency of lower 
over-fitting rate (Andrews & Currim, 2003). 
The models fit the data well with pseudo-R2 values ranging from 0.294 to 0.431. M3 performs 
better than M1 and M2 in terms of LL, AIC, pseudo-R2, and the likelihood ratio test (χ2(30 d.f.) 
= 788 and χ2(2 d.f.) = 10.30 against M1 and M2 respectively), but performs marginally worse 
than M2 based on BIC. Better performance of M3 over M2 indicates that the inclusion of 
behavioural intention (BI) in the class membership sub-model significantly improves model fit 
and provides support for inclusion of BI information. 
Models M1 and M2 with nonlinear effects specification for Savings perform better than their 
counterpart linear effects models M0 and M4, respectively. These results provide strong 
support for the utility specification presented in Equation (1ʹ). Considering M1 and M0, the 
null Hypothesis II of a single coefficient for Savings is rejected based on the Wald test of linear 
restrictions with χ2 = 123.62 and p-value = .0001. Furthermore, M3 out-performs its 
counterpart M5 with a utility function specified in Equation (1).14 
To address endogeneity concerns due to the use of BI in the class membership equation in M3, 
an alternative LC model M6 was estimated using fitted values for BI obtained from an ordered 
Probit model with socio-demographic characteristics as explanatory variables. Socio-
demographic characteristics were found to be poor predictors of BI. The coefficients of BI are 
all highly insignificant in M6, which performs worse than M3, the preferred model. 
                                                          
14 Results for M5 and M6 are presented in Table B.2 in the Appendix. 
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Table 6: MNL and LC model regression results (t values are in parentheses) (N =224)  
MNL (M1) LC Model (M2) LC Model with BI (M3) 
  Class Class 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
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(0.90) 
2.550c     
(6.68) 








-0.096c       
(-2.80) 
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0.009c       
(2.97) 
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(-1.29) 
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(-1.24) 
-0.641a    
(-1.67) 
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(-0.33) 
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(-3.85) 
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(-1.74) 
-0.573     
(-1.16) 
























































Class probability model 
Constant 1.240c              
(4.71) 




Behavioural Intention (BI)  0.372b 
(2.06) 




Class Probability 0.416c 0.459c 0.125c 0.405 0.456 0.139 
Model fit       
K 13 41 43 
LL -2075.05 -1686.19 -1681.04 
AIC 4176.1 3454.4 3448.1 
CAIC 4265.8 3455.7 3744.6 
BIC 4252.8 3696.1 3701.6 
McFadden Pseudo-R2 0.294 0.429 0.431 
c, b, a Significant at .01, .05, and .1 level, respectively. 
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 All parameters for non-price attributes are significant at the 5% level in at least one of the 
classes in M3 indicating that non-price attributes are significant determinants of switching. The 
null Hypothesis I is rejected at the 5% level of significance. The results from all the models 
show how each attribute contributes to explaining the variation in choices observed within the 
sample. M3 results show that each class has its own set of utility functions, which differ from 
other classes in terms of the values and/or signs of parameter estimates and the variables that 
enter the utility functions – i.e., choices are determined by different sets of variables with their 
corresponding class-specific parameters. Membership probabilities for classes 1, 2, and 3 are 
about 40%, 46%, and 14%, respectively. Membership is probabilistic rather than deterministic 
and all results and following discussion should be interpreted in this perspective.  
The estimated parameters are interpreted as taste intensities or average marginal effects on the 
non-stochastic or deterministic component of indirect utility. These are also the same 
parameters of the nonlinear logit probabilities of alternatives. As such, the parameter estimates 
have no straightforward behavioural interpretation beyond their significance and signs, which 
indicate whether a variable of interest has a positive or negative influence on utility or choice 
probabilities (Hensher et al., 2005). 
Taste intensities for Savings (γ1, γ2, γ3, and γ4) decrease in each preference class (except class 3 
where γ2 > γ1) as sensitivity to power bill savings falls, which provides theoretical validity to 
the model. The counter intuitive result (γ2 > γ1) in class 3 implies that respondents with a higher 
savings threshold ($200) for switching are more sensitive to power bill savings than 
respondents with lower savings thresholds ($100). This suggests that respondents in class 3 
who answered “Yes” to switching at $100 may have displayed a form of “yea saying”, because 
their choices over the choice tasks indicate lower sensitivity to savings as evidenced by a lower 
value estimate of γ1. In classes 1 and 2 (at least 86% of the market), the relative magnitudes of 
the Savings coefficients suggest consistency between respondents’ choices and responses to 
the question probing sensitivity to power bill savings. This provides further evidence in support 
of Hypothesis II that 𝛾𝛾1 > 𝛾𝛾2 > 𝛾𝛾3 > 𝛾𝛾4; that is, respondents with lower savings thresholds for 






5.2.1. Class membership and behavioural intentions 
All parameter estimates in the class probability model are significant at the 5% level. For 
identification purposes, all membership equation parameters in class 3 are normalized to zero 
as they act as a reference point for identification of the coefficients for the other two classes’ 
membership equations. The constants in classes 1 and 2 are positive indicating the average 
influence of unobserved effects on class membership relative to class 3. The coefficient for 
behavioural intention (BI) is positive in classes 1 and 2 indicating that respondents who intend 
to switch supplier (potential switchers) have a higher likelihood of belonging to these classes 
compared to class 3. This makes sense as class 3 is characterized by large inertia and lower 
sensitivity to power bill savings. Furthermore, the coefficient for BI is largest in class 2, 
implying that potential switchers have the highest likelihood of belonging to this class, 
indicating consistency between the class probability model and the choice model.  
Apart from improving model fit, the inclusion of BI in the class membership model influences 
the relative sizes of the market segments. For example, class membership probabilities of 
classes 1 and 2 fall slightly by 2.64% and 0.65%, respectively, whilst that of class 3 increases 
by 11.2%. This higher probability for class 3 brings it closer to estimates from previous studies 
in New Zealand that identify a similar preference class with a probability of 18-23% 
(Electricity Authority, 2011, 2012a, 2013a, 2015). A plausible speculation that is consistent 
with these findings is that the inclusion of BI, a psychological construct based on the theory of 
planned behaviour, improves the characterization of heterogeneity of preferences and that 
endogeneity effects, if any, caused by the use of BI may have been small. 
5.2.2. Preference classes for the attributes of electricity services 
We label class 1 representing about 40% of the market as “Bargain hunters” because they are 
most sensitive to power bill savings, call waiting time and prefer longer fixed rate contracts on 
good deals (lower power bills). “Bargain hunters” have positive preferences for the status quo 
(current supplier), which indicates switching inertia - i.e., they will only switch when power 
bill savings exceed a certain minimum threshold. A positive preference for local ownership of 
supplier implies that, all things being equal, “Bargain hunters” would switch to suppliers with 
higher local ownership. These consumers are more likely to respond to campaigns like “What’s 
My Number” for higher savings and price guarantee, but would require information on local 
ownership of supplier to make optimal switching decisions.  
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Respondents in Class 2, representing 46% of the market are labelled as “Potentially mobile but 
discerning” because they exhibit no loyalty to their current supplier and value all the attributes. 
They dislike longer call waiting time and non-traditional power companies, and have positive 
preferences for fixed rate contracts, loyalty rewards, renewables and local ownership of 
supplier. This potentially mobile market segment is a challenge to retailers who want to retain 
or increase market shares as more factors influence switching behaviour. On the other hand, 
this class offers retailers an opportunity to compete in different ways based on marginal rates 
of substitution between attributes. For example, a supplier may price above competitors and 
still retain market share by offering commensurate increases (decreases) in non-price attributes 
for which respondents have a positive (negative) preference. Since all the design attributes 
influence switching in this market segment, this provides support for Hypothesis I.  
Class 3, labeled as “Captive and loyal”, represents the smallest market segment (14% of the 
market) characterized by a large inertia or strong preference for the status quo, negative 
preference for fixed rate contracts and indifference to call waiting time. Large inertia exhibited 
by “Captive and loyal” customers implies that only large changes in non-price attributes or 
unpleasant experience with the incumbent may induce switching. Some respondents in this 
class will not switch supplier for any level of power bill savings, i.e., γ4 = 0, creating a challenge 
for regulators and an opportunity for retailers to behave non-competitively.   
The observed preference for the status quo by “Bargain hunters” and “Captive and loyal” 
customers implies switching inertia and is consistent with reference-dependent utility theories 
(Kahneman et al., 1991; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). Other 
reasons for the status quo effect often proffered in the literature include loss aversion 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), regret avoidance (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988), loyalty to 
the incumbent (Gamble et al., 2009; Gärling et al., 2008), and choice task complexity.15 
5.2.3. Summary of the preference classes and characteristics of respondents   
A summary of the three latent preference classes described in the previous is presented in Table 
7. Table 8 presents the characteristics of respondents with a high probability of membership in 
                                                          
15 We expect the effect of choice task complexity to have been small because less than 2% of respondents rated 
their understanding of the choice tasks below ‘fair’, while 13% rated “How easy was it to make your choices in 
scenarios 1 to 12?” as either ‘difficult or somewhat difficult’, and none rated it as ‘very difficult’. 
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each class. Identifying the socio-demographic characteristics and attitudes of respondents in 
each segment is important for policy targeting, customer profiling and marketing.  
   Table 7: Summary of preference classes 









Status quo  + 0 ++ 
Time - - - 0 
Fixed price guarantee + + - 
Loyalty rewards 0 + ++ 
Renewables 0 + + 
Local ownership + + ++ 
New electricity company 0 0 - 
New non-electricity company 0 - - - 
Well-known non-electricity company 0 - 0 
Power bill savings strong moderate weak 
Segment size 40.5% 45.6% 13.9% 
Notes: +,-, 0, indicate positive, negative, and neutral preferences. Double signs = stronger preferences 
“Bargain hunters” consists of younger retail customers (44 years) with the highest average 
annual personal income (NZ$48,200), highest switching rate (28%) and highest likelihood of 
having dependent children (48%). They are more likely to have larger households and better 
education compared to other groups, which may explain the observed high sensitivity to power 
bill savings and high switching rate. “Bargain hunters” have the lowest environmental attitude 
core, which may explain why they do not care about renewables. It is interesting to note that 
their average behavioral intention (BI) score of -0.08 is very close to zero and may have been 
influenced by the higher proportion of respondents who switched supplier in the past two years. 
This may explain the positive yet relatively weaker preference for the status quo compared to 
Class 3. 
“Potentially mobile but discerning” customers exhibit no loyalty to the incumbent, express a 
positive intention to switch supplier (BI = 0.3), and would choose a retailer based on the value 
of all attributes. This group is dominated by women (54%), has lower average income than 
“Bargain hunters”, and has the highest average environmental attitude score (54.03) hence the 
positive preference for renewables. This is consistent with findings from previous studies that 
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women tend to have stronger pro-environmental attitudes than men (e.g., Clark et al., 2003; Ek 
& Soderholm, 2008). “Captive and loyal” customers exhibit very strong preferences for 
incumbent traditional supplier, loyalty rewards, and local ownership of supplier. They have the 
highest average age, lowest income, smallest household size and are least sensitive to power 
bill savings. 
Table 8: Characteristics of respondents in each class 
Socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics 
of respondents in market segments 
Class 
1 2 3 
Segment size 92 (41%) 101 (45%) 31 (14%) 
Gender (proportion of males) % 50 46 42 
Average age (years) 44 45 47 
Average Income (NZ$) 48,200 43,800 39,100 
 
Ethnicity 
NZ-European (%) 74 78 84 
Maori (%) 2 6 6 
Other (%) 24 16 10 
Child (% with at least one child) 48 38 29 
Average Household size 3.4 3.2 2.9 
At least Bachelors (%) 37 28 19 
Switched supplier in the past 2 years (%) 28 17 13 
Behavioural intentions (%) -0.08 0.30 -0.89 
Environment attitude score 50.18 54.03 51.94 
Said “Yes” to switching at savings of:  NZ$100 68% 64% 32% 
NZ$200 17% 20% 29% 
NZ$300 7% 8% 13% 
NZ$400 +  8% 8% 26% 
 
In the next section we estimate WTP for non-price attributes based on regression results for 
models M1 and M3 discussed in section 4.2. 
5.3. Estimating WTP for non-price attributes  
Based on standard practice, the average marginal WTP for each non-price attribute (k) is 
calculated as the ratio of the marginal utility of the attribute to the marginal utility of power 












 ,       𝑑𝑑 = 1, 2, 3, 4                                                          (4)   
where S is the Switchd_Savings variable defined previously and λ is a scale parameter. The 
marginal utilities of the attributes are the first partial derivatives of the utility function with 
respect to each attribute, which turn out to be the parameter estimates presented earlier in Table 
6 because the non-stochastic component of indirect utility is specified as a linear function. 
From Equation (4), WTP is scale free and can be compared across models and datasets. 
Marginal WTP estimates are presented in Table 9. The columns under each model and/or class 
heading labelled as γ1, γ2, γ3, and γ4 represent the four groups of respondents who would switch 
supplier at savings levels of NZ$100, NZ$200, NZ$300, and NZ$400+, respectively. Since 
there are four parameters for the Savings variable, WTP for each attribute is based on each 
estimate of γ. The delta method was used to compute the standard errors for WTP.   
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Table 9: WTP for non-price attributes of electricity services (NZ$2014).1 
 MNL (M1) Latent Class Model (M3) 
Class 1 (Bargain hunters) Class 2 (Mobile and discerning) Class 3 (Captive and loyal) 
























































































































































































NS NS NS NS NS 
 
Class Probability 40% 46% 14% 
 
 1NZ$1 = US$0.8389. 2NS indicates that WTP is not statistically different from zero based on the respective parameter estimates which are insignificant even at the 10% 
level. a Significant at the 10% level.  
Note: figures in parentheses are the standard errors.  The column for γ4 is omitted in class 3 as the coefficient of Switch4_Savings is highly insignificant and WTP may 




WTP estimates based on the MNL model (M1) are significant at the 5% level, indicating that 
respondents value all the attributes of electricity services irrespective of the level of sensitivity 
to savings. Preferences for non-price attributes become stronger as sensitivity to bill savings 
falls, i.e. respondents who would only switch supplier for at least NZ$400 in power bill savings 
and those who would not switch based on any of the investigated level of savings value non-
price attributes of electricity services the most, followed by those who would switch at 
NZ$300. The absolute values of WTP for all non-price attributes increase from γ1 to γ4. 
Model M1 results suggest that respondents with a strong preference for non-price attributes of 
electricity services are less likely to switch supplier on the basis of power bill savings alone. 
This has substantive implications for policies designed to promote switching in retail electricity 
markets. Negative WTP for non-traditional suppliers indicates that these suppliers have to 
charge lower prices. For example, new electricity companies have to charge at least NZ$133 
per year less than traditional suppliers, whilst new non-electricity companies and well-known 
non-electricity companies have to charge at least NZ$224 and NZ$141 less, respectively. These 
amounts exclude the status quo effect or incumbent value of NZ$18.42 per month and apply to 
about 62% of respondents who are the most sensitive to power bill savings. This demonstrates 
that even where only the most savings-sensitive consumers are considered, price convergence 
in retail electricity markets is unlikely, and partly explains why switching rates are lower than 
expected. The incumbent value estimate of NZ$18.42 supports findings by Hortaçsu et al. 
(2017) where the incumbent value was less than US$16 after five years of deregulation in 
Texas, USA.    
WTP estimates based on the LC model (M3) provide insight into the preferences of consumers 
in three segments of the retail market and allow for possible product designs and policies 
targeted at specific market segments. For example, any supplier type offering low call waiting 
time, longer fixed rate contracts and higher local ownership may target the market segment 
represented by “Bargain hunters” (40%). Estimates of marginal WTP for Rewards, 
Renewables, and Supplier type are not significantly different to zero for “Bargain hunters” 
indicating that improvements in the levels of these attributes would not induce switching. 
Furthermore, “Bargain hunters” have the lowest WTP for non-price attributes of electricity 
services. They are willing to pay an extra NZ$4.75 to NZ$9.00 per month to a retailer offering 
25% more local ownership compared to NZ$12.75 to NZ$26.25 for “Potentially mobile but 
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discerning”, ceteris paribus16. These results are consistent with estimates from a revealed 
preference study by Daglish (2016), which showed that consumers are willing to pay a 
premium of NZ$16.79 per month for a 50% increase in local ownership.  
The upper value for each range of WTP in each class only applies to a small proportion of the 
market consisting of customers who would only switch supplier at annual savings level of at 
least NZ$400 and those who would not switch for any level of savings. Campaigns such as 
“What’s My Number” that promote switching based on price differences are likely to be 
effective when targeted at “Bargain hunters”. 
“Potentially mobile but discerning” consumers are willing to pay on average between 
NZ$19.87 and NZ$41.04 more per month to a supplier offering loyalty rewards and between 
NZ$5.30 and NZ$11.00 to secure a 10% increase in renewables in their fuel mix. For an 
increase of 10% in local ownership these respondents are willing to pay between NZ$5.10 and 
NZ$10.05 more per month. A retailer offering a 24 months fixed rate contract may charge 
between NZ$9.36 and NZ$19.44 more per month, compared to similar retailers offering 
variable rate contracts, without losing its customers. Informing these consumers that switching 
to competitors would save them between NZ$112 and NZ$233 per year would not result in any 
switches if these competitors are not offering at least 24 months fixed rate contracts.  
To attract “Potentially mobile and discerning” consumers, non-electricity companies entering 
the retail market have to charge between NZ$135 and NZ$681 less per year compared to 
traditional suppliers. A retailer able to reduce call waiting time by 5 minutes may charge 
between NZ$6 and NZ$12.35 more per month without losing its market share, other things 
being equal. These results indicate that for 46% of the market, substantial price differences in 
the retail market may not induce switching as these differences may reflect the value and level 
of provision of non-price attributes across competitors. These WTP values indicate potential 
for niche markets where retailers can offer differentiated product services at a premium. 
Furthermore, these values suggest that switching campaigns that rely mainly on publicizing 
price differences may be ineffective on at least 46% of the market.        
                                                          
16 The WTP amounts are obtained by multiplying the marginal WTP estimates presented in Table 9 with the 
respective changes in the level of the attributes. This assumes constant marginal WTP, which may be criticised as 
evidence of lack of scope sensitivity, an issue that is well documented in the literature. However, we use relatively 
small changes which are likely to be realistic and less likely to be seriously affected by lack of scope sensitivity 
if any.   
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The absolute values of marginal WTP estimates for “Captive and loyal” consumers (14%) tend 
to be higher than those of respondents in other classes except in the case of renewables in Class 
2. This is expected as Class 2 has a higher average environmental attitude score than Class 3. 
The negative preference for fixed rate contracts means that retailers offering 24-month fixed 
rate contracts would have to charge between NZ$15.36 and NZ$32.64 less per month to retain 
customers in this market segment. A new non-electricity company would have to charge 
between NZ$414 and NZ$880 less per year in order to attract “Captive and loyal” customers 
compared to traditional retailers. These amounts are above the average annual savings 
publicized during the switching promotion campaign in New Zealand indicating that 
consumers in this market segment are unlikely to switch supplier under current market 
conditions. 
5.4. Switching Inertia 
For 60% of the market (Class 2 and Class 3), the marginal WTP estimates for supplier type 
clearly indicate that incumbent traditional retailers enjoy large premiums in the market. This 
offers one possible explanation for the observed price dispersion in the retail electricity markets 
in New Zealand, and why despite of the entry of more than 18 non-traditional retailers, the “Big 
5” still dominate the retail electricity markets. 
6. Conclusions  
We estimated a discrete choice model of consumer switching in retail electricity markets in 
New Zealand using data from a choice experiment. Our results are strongly consistent with 
Hypothesis I, that non-price attributes are important determinants of consumer switching in 
deregulated electricity markets; clearly price is not all that matters. Latent class model results 
indicate the presence of three preference classes characterised as “Bargain hunters” (40%), 
“Potentially mobile but discerning” (46%), and “Captive and loyal” (14%). Policy implications 
of these findings are: (1) switching promotions should provide consumers information on the 
levels of non-price attributes, and (2) policies may be tailored for specific consumer groups. 
The presence of market segments provides retailers opportunities to differentiate their products. 
The results support the specification of a non-linear marginal utility structure in the model used 
to analyse the data (Hypothesis II) which may, in part, explain why some consumers do not 
switch supplier. For example, consumers with low marginal utility of power bill savings are 
unlikely to switch at prevailing market average savings. 
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The inclusion of behavioural intentions (BI) in the class membership sub-model improves both 
the characterisation of market segments and model fit, highlighting the importance of including 
attitudes in models of consumer switching (Hypothesis III). Respondents with high BI scores 
are more likely to belong to “Bargain hunters” or “Potentially mobile but discerning” group 
compared to “Captive and loyal”.   
When WTP for non-price attributes of electricity services is taken into account, the market 
average level of savings may be inadequate to induce some respondents to switch from 
traditional suppliers to new entrants. These findings offer one possible explanation why, 
despite the increase in the number of new retailers, the top five traditional retailers in New 
Zealand continue to dominate the retail market. Non-price attributes may partly explain the 
perceived ‘stickiness’ or inertia in retail electricity markets where the price or the level of 
savings are assumed to be the only drivers for consumer switching. Therefore, from a 
competition policy perspective, price dispersion should be seen as a natural aspect of a market 
where consumers value non-price attributes, have a preference for the status quo (traditional 
supplier), and a dislike for new entrants particularly non-traditional suppliers.   
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Appendix A. Information criteria and segment retention for M3  





lnL AIC crAIC AIC3 CAIC BIC HQC 
1 13 -2075 4176.1 4176.2 4189.1 4265.8 4252.8 4203.8 
2 28 -1816 3688.9 3689.5 3716.9 3882.0 3854.0 3748.6 
3 43 -1681 3448.1 3449.5 3491.1 3744.6 3701.6 3539.8 
4 58 -1636 3387.8 3390.4 3445.8 3787.8 3729.8 3511.5 
5 73 -1622 3390.4 3394.5 3463.4 3893.9 3820.9 3546.1 
6 88 -1591 3357.2 3363.2 3445.2 3964.1 3876.1 3544.9 
 
 








Appendix B. Regression results for MNL model (M0) and LCM model M4  
Table B.1. MNL and LCM model results with linear Savings effects 
Variable  MNL (M0) LCM (M4) 
Class 1  Class 2  Class 3  








Time -0.0404c      
(-5.57) 
-0.0416b     
(-2.08) 




































New electricity company -0.3557c     
(-3.76) 
-0.1932      
(-0.79) 
-0.1576      
(-1.06) 
-0.7677      
(-1.41) 
New non-electricity company -0.6744c     
(-5.49) 
-0.2091      
(-0.66) 
-0.6705c     
(-3.84) 
-1.5098a     
(-1.84) 




-0.3013a     
(-1.87) 










     
Class Probability  0.4886c 0.4101c 0.1104c 
  
K 10 32 
LL -2136.96 -1703.44 
AIC 4293.9 3470.9 
BIC 4352.9 3659.6 
McFadden Pseudo-R2 0.2731 0.423 







Table B.2. Regression results for LC models M5 and M6 (t values are in parentheses) 
 M5 (original BI scores and 
linear Savings effects)  
M6 (fitted BI and nonlinear 
Savings effects) 





















-0.090c       
(-2.82) 
-0.027c       
(-2.89) 
























































-0.316        
(-0.93) 
-0.222        
(-1.61) 
-1.157b        
(-2.32) 






-0.501        
(-0.12) 
-0.746c        
(-4.35) 
-2.405c        
(-2.95) 


















   











































-0.006     
(-0.25) 




Class Probability 0.487 0.402 0.110 0.416 0.458 0.125 
Model fit       
K 34 43 
LL -1698.61 -1685.26 
AIC 3465.1 3456.8 
CAIC 3466.1 3458.0 
BIC 3665.7 3710.1 
McFadden Pseudo-R2 0.425 0.429 
c, b, a Significant at .01, .05, and .1 level, respectively 
 
